A century-old law, the Jones Act, is keeping coastal shipping off the mapโwhile traffic, costs, and emissions keep rising on land.

This article is adapted from my Substack, which offers weekly articles on California. You can get 50% off a subscription with this link. It helps fund the work we do here at California Curated. These articles take a ton of work, and if you enjoy the publication, weโd be grateful to have your support.
President Trump recently issued a temporary waiver of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, also known as the Jones Act, allowing oil to be moved on foreign-flagged vessels between US ports in an effort to ease supply constraints and lower prices. The move put a spotlight back on this century-old law that quietly shapes how goods move around the United States. Then on Sunday, 60 Minutes aired a segment examining the Jones Act itself and the decline of the U.S. maritime industry it was designed to protect. The picture it painted was not of a thriving, competitive shipbuilding sector, but of one that has been in steady decline for decades, particularly compared to the massive shipbuilding industries of places like China, Japan, and South Korea.
The topic is familiar to me. A few years ago, I reported on the Jones Act for Quartz and asked important questions about how the act impacts California. Iโd like to readdress that question here because the issues I wrote about then are just as important now, if not more so.

The Jones Act is protectionist. Donโt let anyone tell you differently. It was designed to shield U.S. shipbuilders and maritime operators from foreign competition, reserving domestic shipping for American-built and American-crewed vessels in the name of national security and economic self-reliance. Sadly, as 60 Minutes pointed out clearly, it has not done its job very well.
In California, the Jones Act effectively prevents the state from experimenting with something it seems perfectly built for: a “blue highway” running just offshore, moving goods between ports instead of forcing so much of it onto already traffic-clogged roads. And with congestion worsening, infrastructure under strain, and growing pressure to cut carbon emissions, it is worth looking again at how California could begin to solve several huge problems. Because if this century-old policy were rethought, or even partially reformed, California could open the door to a new era of coastal shipping and transportation innovation.

California is defined by trade. Cargo arrives from across the Pacific, pours through Los Angeles and Long Beach, the largest port system in the country, it spreads into warehouses and rail yards, and then begins its second journey up and down the state. Trucks clog I-5. Trains thread through the Central Valley. The coastline, though, stretching past the stateโs major population centers, remains oddly quiet.
Itโs strange. One of the worldโs busiest maritime regions depends overwhelmingly on highways to move goods between its own coastal cities. WTF is going on here?
In theory, the ocean should be part of Californiaโs domestic freight system. Ships already cross it every day carrying containers, vehicles, fuel, and raw materials from Asia. A smaller feeder vessel moving containers, automobiles, construction materials, or empty containers between Southern California and the Bay Area would be entirely ordinary by global standards.
But not in California. Or the rest of the US, for that matter.

Across Europe, short sea shipping is a core part of logistics networks. Containers arrive at major ports like Rotterdam and are redistributed by smaller feeder vessels to secondary ports rather than being hauled long distances by truck. Japan, South Korea, and China all operate extensive coastal shipping systems linking major industrial regions. In those places, the ocean functions as an extension of the transportation network, not just an international gateway.
Not here. There is no blue highway.
The problem is the Jones Act. Because foreign-built vessels cannot carry cargo between U.S. ports, the enormous potential to offload a huge portion of shipping traffic onto the sea is lost. Under the Jones Act, ships must be built in the United States, flagged here and manned entirely by US crew. The first part of that is the rub, because it is prohibitively expensive, and sometimes not even possible, to build ships here. Exactly the problem the Jones Act was supposed to solve.
So all freight stays on land.

The consequences show up everywhere. The I-5 corridor carries immense truck traffic moving containers, agricultural goods, vehicles, and construction materials between Southern California and the Bay Area. Highways wear down. Congestion builds. Supply chains slow.
In Los Angeles, drivers lose roughly 80 to more than 130 hours a year sitting in traffic. If you live here, you know we have a term for it: soul-crushing. But it also translates into real economic loss, roughly $1,500 per driver annually, and billions of dollars across the region. Statewide, congestion costs run into the tens of billions when lost time, fuel, and freight delays are combined.
Trucks are a huge part of the problem. They burn fuel in traffic. They wear down infrastructure. Sure, they move goods efficiently door to door, but at scale they add to the strain.
And yet, just offshore, there is another option.

Marine transport is significantly more energy efficient per ton-mile than trucking. Even modest coastal shipping could remove thousands of truck trips, reduce emissions, and add redundancy when rail lines shut down or highways close due to wildfire or accidents. The coastline offers a ready-made corridor that requires no new pavement.
Studies have repeatedly pointed to the benefits. A West Coast marine highway analysis identified the Los Angeles to Oakland route as one of the most promising coastal shipping corridors, currently entirely unused. Another assessment estimated that even at 10 percent market penetration, coastal shipping between Southern California and the Bay Area could divert more than 2,500 truckloads per day in each direction.
But not with the Jones Act.
Its defenders argue that it protects national security and maritime jobs. Those concerns are real. But the results after almost 100 years show that at least as far as jobs are concerned, that ahem, ship has sailed. The United States today builds only a tiny fraction of the worldโs commercial ships, far behind China, South Korea, and Japan. The number of large U.S.-flagged vessels has diminished to almost nothing, as the 60 Minutes piece pointed out. American shipping is already in rapid decline and thereโs very little that can be done to solve the problem.
Critics have pointed this out for years. John McCain called the law โprotectionism at its worst,โ arguing that it distorted markets without achieving its goals. Analysts across the political spectrum have made similar arguments, pointing to higher shipping costs and limited competition in domestic maritime markets.

In places that depend heavily on ocean shipping, the impacts are even more direct. Bringing goods to and from Hawaii, for example, is dominated by a small number of carriers, including Matson. Thatโs why even basic goods in Hawaii like milk, eggs, and fuel are often 20โ50% higher than on the mainland, reflecting both shipping costs and the lack of competitive alternatives.
In California, the impact shows up as heavy traffic, more pollution, and degraded infrastructure. But there are even more opportunities lost. Imagine being able to take a ferry from San Diego to LA. Or LA to San Francisco. Or San Diego to Seattle. A cruise ship, perhaps? A slow-ish energy-efficient cruise ship that goes up the whole West Coast for retirees wanting to experience the glorious West Coast. How cool would that be? Alas, too bad. I mean, a ferry between Los Angeles and San Francisco isnโt prohibited in theory. But it would have to use a US-built vessel. That makes it prohibitively more expensive to launch than similar services in Europe or Asia, where operators can purchase vessels from a global market.
Entrepreneurs have tried to make this work before. When I first reported this story, there were even claims that British businessman Richard Branson, founder of the Virgin Group, had explored a high-speed coastal ferry capable of making the Los Angeles to San Francisco trip in eight to ten hours. Whether or not that specific plan ever fully materialized, the broader idea has surfaced repeatedly. Others have tried and failed. It has never taken hold, in large part because of the economics shaped by the Jones Act.
The Jones Act does not ban coastal shipping. It makes it difficult enough that it rarely happens at scale. Even today, proposals like a Santa MonicaโMalibu โBlue Highwayโ ferry are still in early stages, facing the same cost and feasibility challenges. The ship would be Jones Act compliant. Itโs hard not to wonder how much bigger, faster, and more ambitious these projects could be if operators were allowed to buy vessels on the global market.

So what can be done? One place to start is the most restrictive piece of the law: the U.S.-build requirement. Allowing foreign-built, U.S.-flagged vessels to operate in domestic trade and human transport would immediately expand the pool of ships and lower the cost of entry, making it possible to test routes that today never get off the ground. Or sea.
Weโre constantly searching for ways to reduce congestion, cut emissions, and extend the life of infrastructure thatโs falling apart. Yeah, weโre investing in rail, and some of it is doing a great job, although the California High-Speed rail project is currently a costly disaster. All the while, one of the most obvious transportation corridors remains largely unused.
So, a century-old law, passed in a very different era, continues to shape how goods move through the 4th largest economy in the world. Why? The coastline is there. The cargo is there. The need is there.
The question is whether the policy will ever catch up.











































